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1. A Brief History of Race and Violence in the U.S. 
Race relations in the United States during the 20th century con-
tinues to be viewed from the perspective of power differentials 
between blacks and whites. The conflict that has resulted from the 
power differentials manifests itself in racial confrontations. 
During the first four decades of the 20th century, racial confronta-
tion in the U.S. is described by Morris Janowitz as white aggression 
against the black community, in the form of communal riots. 
Communal riots are characterized by entire white communities, 
collectively, attacking whole communities of blacks. White casualties 
in these disturbances are few, since the violence originates with and is 
controlled and directed by whites 1. The one-sided character of 
communal violence led Gunnar Myrdal 2 to point out that the so-called 
race riots were more a "one-way terrorization" than a race riot. The 
communal riots were fueled, in part, by the rapid growth and 
transformation of American cities at the turn of the 20th century. 
Large numbers of white immigrants and black migrants moved to the 
more industrialized cities and settled in segregated enclaves under 
conditions that could not accommodate them. There were housing 
shortages, high levels of unemployment, and poverty. Competition 
for jobs created conditions necessary for conflict3. This pattern of 
1 Morris JANOWITZ, "Patterns of Collective Racial Violence" in Hugh 
Davis GRAHAM and Ted Robert GURR (Eds.) The History of Violence in 
America, New York, The New York Times Company, 1969, pp. 414-15. 
2 Gunnar MYRDAL, An American Dilemma, New York, Harper and 
Brothers, 1944, p. 567. 
3 M. JANOWITZ, op. cit., p. 415. 
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racial conflict dominated the urban landscape up until the nineteen 
forties. 
The migration of blacks from rural areas to major cities, and the 
subsequent urbanization of blacks in the U.S. during the first four 
decades of the 20th century was marked by the growth of a more 
militant response by the black community to communal violence. By 
the 1940s, black communities were established, comprising higher 
concentrations of long-term residents. This militant response is re-
ferred to as counter-violence. The counter-violence is most likely to 
be set off by an incident involving the police in the black community 
where some actual or believed violation of usual police practice has 
taken place. This type of violence is manifest by outbursts against 
property and retail establishments. The emphasis is on destroying 
property, looting and arson, thereby, giving rise to the notion of 
commodity riots4. According to Martin Luther King, Jr. 5, property 
was targeted because it was viewed as a symbol of the white power 
structure. Likewise, there is another symbolic aspect related to 
looting in the riots. Robert Fogelson contends that looting can be con-
sidered a political act because it is a direct attack upon the concept of 
private property rights6. As Russell Dynes and E.L. Quarantelli note 7, 
the looting that occurred in the riots is a bid for the redistribution of 
property. Finally, the rioters directed their anger not against white 
citizens but against the police and military, white merchants and 
white absentee landlords as symbols of white authority and privilege. 
As a result, the vast majority of injuries and deaths were inflicted on 
rioters by the police and military 8. In comparison to communal-type 
rioting which is characterized by the scarcity of handguns and rifles, 
Janowitz characterizes commodity-type rioting as having a greater 
dispersal and much more intensive use of firearms. According to 
4 Robert FOGELSON, Violence as Protest: A Study of Riots and Ghettos, 
Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1971, p. 22. 
5 Martin Luther KING, Jr., "Showdown for Nonviolence," in James M. 
WASHINGTON (ed.), The Essential Writings and Speeches of Martin Luther 
King, Jr., San Francisco: Harper Collins, 1991, p. 70. 
R. FOGELSON, op. cit, p. 81. 
7 Russell DYNES and E.L. QUARANTELLI., "Looting in American 
Cities", Transaction, May 1968. 
8 R. FOGELSON, op. cit., p. 84. 
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Janowitz, "they are escalated riots because of the more extensive but 
still scattered use of weaponry" 9. 
In his examination of political systems, David Olson contends that 
most political scientists view political violence as irrational and 
pathological behavior outside the boundaries of orthodox political 
behavior. Olson argues against this narrow definition of the term 
"political" 1 0, which requires that political violence be linked to public 
issues and must contribute to a stable democracy. Olson explains that 
because political violence is an empirical question requiring research, 
most political scientists assume a priori that public issues are absent 
from civil violence, civil war and revolutions \ But according to Ol-
son the opposite is true: 
...civil war raises public issues of nation integration; revolution 
involves generalized authority issues of who is to govern and how; 
and rioting involves public issues insofar as established power rela-
tions are challenged...Similarly, the model of a stable democracy is 
not particularly serviceable as a framework for assessing possible 
functions served by civil violence 1 2. 
2. Political Models for Social Change 
In the social science literature, there are two general competing 
perspectives (or general models) of political reality. One perspective 
is referred to as a consensus model, the other is a conflict model. The 
conflict model emphasizes the inherent conflict of interests between 
different groups in society, and the consensus model emphasizes the 
mutuality of interests. The conflict model stresses the role of the state 
in expressing the interests of a particular group (especially elites), but 
the consensus model presents the state as a value-neutral entity. In the 
latter setting, interest groups share a more or less equal footing and 
balance is reached through a process of bargaining, compromise and 
9 M. JANOWITZ, op. cit., p. 419. 
1 0 Edward GREENBERG, Neal MILNER and David OLSON, Black 
Politics: The Inevitability of Conflict/Readings, New York, Holt, Rinehart 
and Winston, Inc., 1971, p. 273. 
11 Ibidem, pp. 273-274. 
12 Ibidem, p. 275. 
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negotiations. While much of the theoretical debate has centered on 
each model's theoretical commitments (i.e., the methodologies and 
basic tenets), the purpose of the models in this essay is to inquire into 
the logical implications that flow from them for African Americans 
and other national minorities. The primary concern is the utility of 
violence from either a consensus or a conflict perspective. More spe-
cifically, each model is considered for its ability to achieve certain 
desired goals (i.e., due process and equal protection under the law, 
and equities in employment, income, housing, and education). 
In the political science literature, one classical (consensus) model 
proposes a stable and effective democratic system through consensus 
and harmony between a multiplicity of competing groups. Demands 
and grievances are met peacefully and successfully through a process 
of negotiation, bargaining, and compromise. This model is referred to 
as incrementalism or pluralism 1 3. 
The incremental decision-making model offers one set of com-
peting prescriptions for change. This study does not propose to ad-
vance an alternative set of prescriptions but, rather, to suggest incre-
mentalism - pluralism as a viable vehicle for meaningful political and 
social change, and to evaluate the role of violence in a pluralistic so-
ciety. In reference to the assumption of the inevitability of change in 
the consensus model, Robert Dahl (a pluralist) points out that "in the 
entire history of political institutions, no political system has ever 
been immutable" 1 . The incrementalist position maintains that politi-
cal change in the U.S. takes place in small steps, and a mutual ad-
justment of interests occurs so that widely differing values and objec-
tives are balanced for the common good. Furthermore, incremen-
talists argue that change in these "small steps" avoids large mistakes 
and good policies are made by "going through a trial and error 
process" 1 5 . 
13 Ibidem, pp. 3-15 and pp. 274-275. 
1 4 Robert A. DAHL, Modern Political Analysis, Englewood Cliffs, New 
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1970, 2nd edition, p. 46. 
^Charles E. LINDBLOM, "The Science of Muddling Through", in Fred 
A. KRAMER (ed.), Perspectives on Public Bureaucracy, Massachusetts, 
Winthrop Publishers, Inc., 1973. 
The Politics of Violence in America 195 
According to Parenti (a conflict theorist), the United States is not a 
pluralistic society. That is, a wide variety of groups representing all 
sectors of society do not participate in decision-making, nor is the 
power of elites checked by the competing power of other elites. 
Community power studies, which discuss the "indirect power" 
(usually referring to voting) of the poor, often do not include the poor 
within their studies. Pluralists argue that the ability to be heard 
(through voting) is an example that pluralism works. Parenti counters 
that the ability to be heard within a political system is not the same as 
sharing political and economic power. Parenti's "view from the 
bottom" illustrates that power is acquired by those within society who 
already have the most power and influence, and as this political order 
continues large numbers of the population are ignored 1 6. 
In contrast with the pluralist model, an elite model represents a 
conflict perspective that provides an alternative understanding of 
ways in which competing groups in society process demands that is 
appropriate for this discussion. In short, the elite model concentrates 
decision-making power in the hands of a few (elites) and emphasizes 
the inherent conflict of interests among different groups in society. 
Nieburg, a conflict theorist, argues that the pluralist model for social 
change enables "potential violence to have a social effect and to bring 
social accommodation with only token and ritual demonstrations, 
facilitating a process of peaceful political and social change" 1 7 . 
Robert Dahl, a proponent of the pluralist model, supports moderate 
conflict in a pluralistic society. According to Dahl, " . . . in a de-
mocracy moderate political conflict is both inevitable and de-
sirable" 1 8. Dahl, however, interprets " . . . severe political conflict as 
undesirable, for it endangers any political system, and not least a de-
mocracy" 1 9 . 
1 6 Michael PARENT!, "Power and Pluralism: A View from the Bottom", 
The Journal of Politics, n°3, 32, August, 1970, pp. 529-530. 
1 7 H.L. NIEBURG, Political Violence, New York, St. Martin's Press, 
Inc., 1969, p. 159. 
1 8 Robert A. DAHL, Pluralist Democracy in the United States: Conflict 
and Consent, Chicago, Rand McNally and Co., 1967, pp. 270-271 
19 Ibidem, pp. 270-271. 
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Without financial resources to mobilize ghetto residents and 
lacking access to power and influence, the poor and other excluded 
people are unable to effect public policy despite the seriousness of 
their grievances. Deprived of the opportunities to create "issues" of 
their plight through conventional political channels, the grievances of 
the poor are often turned into non-issues by those with opposing po-
litical interests. Rules, procedures, qualifications, and bureaucracies 
are designed from upper-middle class perspectives which work 
against people of color (the poor and national minorities) through 
institutional forms of racism (or discrimination). Institutional racism 
denies opportunities and equal rights to individuals and groups in the 
daily operations of society (through established laws, customs, and 
practices). In the U.S., institutional racism refers to the covert 
(intentional and unintentional) discrimination against African Ameri-
cans (as a nationality or minority group) that produces racial inequi-
ties in American society 2 0. Within this structure, which is exclusive 
and blocks conventional means of redress, violence (e.g., the 1965 
Watts riots) becomes the functional equivalent of legitimate political 
activity. Thus, violence in urban riots is a legitimate form of protest 
to voice grievances; participants and non-participants within the 1965 
Watts curfew zone concurred with this view 2 1 . 
The participants in the 1965 Watts riot, however, did not fit the 
traditional definition of revolutionaries. In their protest, they did not 
plan to fundamentally change American economic relationships but, 
rather, they sought to be included in the system which excluded them. 
In fact, their optimism for the feasibility of this was a strong factor 
leading to the 1965 riots. One conclusion from these views is that 
political violence may take place within or without the "pluralism" of 
American democracy 2 2. That is, violence is not in itself revolutionary. 
2 0 Ibidem, pp. 525-529. 
2 1 David O. SEARS and John B. MCCONAHAY, The Politics of Vio-
lence: The New Urban Blacks and the Watts Riot, Boston, Houghton Mifflin 
Company, Inc., 1973, p. 53, pp. 138-146, and pp. 170-186. 
^Ibidem, pp. 47-50 and pp. 189-96. 
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3. Political Violence 
According to Donatella della Porta, there is no discontinuity 
between protest activity (politics of disruption) and political vio-
lence 2 3 . Both are "collective attacks within a community against a 
political regime." She further argues that "movement-families emerge 
during periods of turmoil, when protest activity intensifies, new 
repertoires of collective action are created, and unconventional action 
spreads to different social sectors: these periods represent the peaks 
of protest cycles" 2 4 . Della Porta's point is that political actors evolve 
through a process of "gradual radicalization" 2 5, as they participate in 
a range of movement-family activities. Martin Luther King, Jr., 
echoes this same point. He argues that when nonviolent protest is 
rudely rebuked, "it is not transformed into resignation and passivity 
... The cohesive, potentially explosive Negro community ... has a 
short fuse" 2 6 and will respond violently to social injustice if 
necessary. Doug McAdam argues that the urban riots during the latter 
part of the 1960s can be seen as the final extension of the politics of 
protest activity 2 7. 
Janowitz argues that there was a decline in "commodity riots" by 
the summer of 1968, replaced by a more selective, terroristic use of 
force against whites (primarily the police) by small, organized groups 
of blacks with unsolidified ideological motives 2 8 . The tragic assassi-
nation of Martin Luther King, Jr., was seen as a prelude to a new type 
of violence that was emerging. A few blacks felt that the "expressive 
orientations" (manifested by mass rioting) achieved too few tangible 
Donatella DELLA PORTA, Social Movement, Political Violence, and 
the State: A Comparative Analysis of Italy and Germany, New York: Cam-
bridge University Press, 1995, pp. 2-3. 
Ibidem, p. 3. 
25 Ibidem, p. 7. 
2 6 Martin Luther KING, Jr., Where Do We Go From Here: Chaos or 
Community?, Boston, Beacon Press, 1967, p. 21. 
2 7 Doug MCADAM, Political Process and the Development of Black In-
surgency, 1930-1970, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1982, p. 
221. 
2 8 Morris JANOWITZ, op. cit., p. 429. 
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benefits. This new type of racial violence appeared to be more goal 
directed and, thus, closer to a type of political violence. This is 
descriptive of a change in the nature of rioting, that is, a shift from 
expressive outbursts to a more instrumental use of violence. Those 
involved were persons who came to believe that white society cannot 
be changed except with violence 2 9. Peter Lupsha characterizes such 
an orientation as "instrumental," reflecting the existence of a leader-
ship cadre which is hopeful of achieving its goals, and which 
possesses a conceptualization of desired ends °. 
Dramatic manifestations of "instrumental" political violence are 
regarded by Terry Ann Knoft as having begun on July 23, 1968, when 
a group of black men killed three policemen in Cleveland, Ohio (The 
Glenville shoot-out). The motivation for this attack was the deep re-
sentment felt by blacks toward their treatment by the police. The po-
lice were viewed as the operant enforcers, and perhaps even more 
importantly as the symbol of white authority over the lives of black 
people 3 1 . A New York Times article described this political violence 
as "the first documented case in recent history of black armed and 
organized violence against the police" 3 2 . 
The riot commission reported that "it is uncertain who fired the 
first shot," yet within an hour and a half, seven people lay dead. Four 
of the fatalities were blacks, three were white policemen. Three more 
blacks were killed later that evening by white vigilantes outside of the 
Glenville area. On July 24, another black was killed by a white vigi-
lante group outside of the Glenville area. A black Cleveland minister 
declared, " . . . once the first shot had been fired, every Negro would 
have been fair game". Violence continued in Glenville and other East 
Side neighborhoods for the next five days 3 3 . 
29 Ibidem, p. 433. 
3 0 Peter LUPSHA. "On Theories of Urban Violence", in Urban Affairs 
Quarterly, n_ 4,1969, p. 273. 
31 The New York Times, July 28,1968; Terry Ann KNOPF, "Sniping ... A 
New Pattern of Violence," in Peter H. ROSSI (ed.), Ghetto Revolts, New 
Brunswick, NJ, Transaction Books, 1973, pp. 96-100. 
3 2 Ibidem, pp. 96-100. 
3 3 Louis H. MASOTTI and Jerome R. CORSI, Shoot-out in Cleveland, 
New York, Praeger Publishers, 1969, pp. 5-22. 
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Because black Mayor Carl B. Stokes succeeded in preventing 
violence in Cleveland after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther 
King, Jr. in April, 1968, "Clevelanders looked upon him as a positive 
guarantee against future racial disturbances in their city" 3 4 . Indeed, 
Stokes' decision to pull out white policemen and National Guardsmen 
from the black community and to entrust the responsibility for the 
maintenance of order to the city's 165 black policemen and to hastily-
organized black citizens' patrols positively reduced the severity of the 
violence and channeled the violence to the negotiating tables. In the 
opinion of most Clevelanders, ". . . Mayor Carl Stokes saved a lot of 
lives, both black and white, by keeping whites out of the Negro area 
the night after the shoot-out" . 
Five blacks were indicted by a Cuyahoga County grand jury 
August 26 on charges of first-degree murder in the July 23 shooting 
of the three policemen and a civilian. Neither the police nor the white 
vigilante group were brought to trial for the killing of the seven 
blacks 3 6 . 
Moreover, shoot-outs with the police continued during the summer 
of 1968 in New York City, Pittsburgh, Oakland, Los Angeles, and 
elsewhere. Indeed, U.S. News and World Report stated that at least 
eight policemen were killed and 47 wounded in such attacks during 
the summer of 1968 3 7 . 
The "peaking" or "triggering incidents" that characterized the po-
litical violence during the summer of 1968 did not particularly in-
volve an extraordinary escalation of hostilities, nor a traumatic event. 
It was simply the breaking point in a long chain of precipitating inci-
dents, because hostilities had reached a point where simply the 
appearance of authority figures acted to precipitate violence 3 8. 
3 4 Ibidem, pp. 5-22. 
35 Ibidem, pp. 5-22. 
3 6 Thomas F. PARKER (ed.), Violence in the U.S., Volume 2, 1968-71, 
New York, Facts on File, Inc., 1974, p. 27. 
37 U.S. News and World Report, October 7, 1968, p. 29. 
3 8 P. LUPSHA, op. cit, p. 291. 
200 James N. Upton 
Conceiving of urban violence as politically meaningful acts in a 
struggle between powerholding group and the emergence of blacks on 
the urban scene appears to be a promising and suggestive framework 
for interpreting political violence. " . . . political violence increases 
when new challengers fight their way into the polity and old polity 
members refuse to leave 3 9 . Approaching political violence from a 
political framework points out that the phenomenon is not one-sided. 
According to della Porta, political violence can be examined in view 
of the interactional effects between emerging minorities and the 
existing powerholders and governmental agents representing them 4 0 . 
Moreover, a political perspective " . . . provides a more satisfactory 
perspective on the role of the governmental authorities in fostering 
and channeling the emergence and development of violent protest" 4 . 
Thus, violence by blacks in the U.S. can be viewed as political acts 
designed to register an impact on the political process through extra-
legal means, under conditions in which regular channels for the ar-
ticulation of group interest are substantially blocked. 
3 9 D. DELLA PORTA, op. cit., p. 9. 
4 0 Ibidem, p. 8. 
4 1 Joe R. FEAGIN and Harlan HAHN, Ghetto Revolts: The Politics of 
Violence in American Cities, New York, MacMillan Publishing Company, 
1973, p. 42 and p. 50. 
